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‘If climate change makes our country uninhabitable, we will march with our wet feet into your 
living rooms’. With these words, uttered out of deep frustration over two decades ago, 
Bangladeshi scientist and climate negotiator Atiq Rahman laid down a challenge to the early 
industrialising nations to take responsibility for their role in rendering the lives of the world’s 
poorer people ever more precarious (Rahman cited in Roberts and Parks, 2007: 2). Rahman has 
not been alone in expressing concerns over the possibility that climate change will set large 
numbers of people on the move. In the wake of long-standing concerns with migration induced 
by environmental degradation, discourses on ‘climate refugees’ crystallised in the 1990s around 
fears that sea level rise, drought and extreme weather events were likely to displace millions of 
people if global warming could not be brought under control (Bettini, 2013).  
 
While this rather linear equation of warming climate with mass mobilisation has subsequently 
been complicated by more discriminating accounts of the motivations, pathways and magnitudes 
of migration, the risks accompanying both slow and abrupt climatic change have not been 
abrogated. Quite the opposite. There is growing evidence that climate change is already adding to 
processes of ‘expulsion’ (Sassen, 2014) that are making agrarian livelihoods more precarious in 
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many tropical, arid and semi-arid regions - and in this way contributing significantly to rural-
urban migration. Looking ahead, we would do well to consider recent scientific counsel that 
‘upgraded’ the 2°C mark from ‘dangerous’ to ‘extremely dangerous’ (Anderson and Bows, 2011) 
and the forecast that each degree Celsius of temperature increase will eventually generate a three 
metre increase in sea level – which without new defences would inundate land currently occupied 
by some 375 million people (Strauss, 2015). COP 21, the latest round of global climate 
negotiations, may have been hailed as a breakthrough in global climate governance, but its 
collective commitments to reduced carbon emission – even if compliance were assured – would 
push the planet towards 3°C of warming.  And in this way, scenarios that in the 1990s seemed 
extreme or catastrophic are now becoming the bottom line for the changes expected to 
materialize in coming decades.  
 
The profound sense of injustice spurring Rahman’s intervention has been an untameable motive 
in climate politics, enshrined in the idea that the nations or regions most likely to suffer the 
harmful effects of climate change tend to be those who have historically benefitted least from the 
consumption of greenhouse gas emitting fuels (Roberts and Parks, 2007).  By showing how 
energy intensive life-styles are directly implicated with debilitating climate change in distant 
regions, critical commentators have sought to encourage those in more privileged regions to take 
greater responsibility for their actions and to care more for those they are endangering (Bond, 
2012; Ciplet, Roberts, & Khan, 2015). In a related sense, it has been argued for some time now 
that the path to workable climate governance might be smoothed if Northern powers were to 
relax their self-interested bargaining stances and go to more trouble to ‘demonstrate solidarity, 
empathy, kindness, friendship, and loyalty to would-be co-operators’ (Roberts and Parks, 2007: 
229). 
 
For all the laudable intentions of the quest to ‘level the playing field’ of climate causality and 
impact, ‘care’ itself is a complex and often paradoxical concept. Its connections and tensions with 
‘justice’ or ‘inequality’ are still relatively underexplored in debates about climate change and its 
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impact on mobility.  Critical theorists of care have been encouraging us to be attentive to the way 
that caring relations and practices themselves are complicated by deeply structured global 
inequality. Who cares for whom, and whose care gains most recognition and reward in an 
intensively but unevenly globalising world are pressing and often perplexing questions – with 
important implications for responding to the challenges of weather and climate (Clark and 
Stevenson, 2003).  But not necessarily in ways we might assume. To offer an example, we have 
indeed recently witnessed considerable numbers of South Asians, many of whom were of 
Bangladeshi heritage, marching wet-footed through the streets and living rooms of Lancashire, 
Cumbria and south Scotland.  They arrived not as displaced people, however, but as emergency 
relief squads responding to the widespread flooding that accompanied December 2015’s Storm 
Desmond.  Muslim civil society organisations in the north of England, already experienced in 
responding to extreme events overseas were able to mobilise quickly to provide food, supplies 
and clean-up assistance to flood-struck communities closer to home (York, 2015).   
 
Perhaps this should no longer come as a surprise. For years now, the roll call of UK ‘flood 
heroes’ – those who have gone beyond the call of duty to assist others in need - has regularly 
included members of the country’s migrant communities.  And providing relief during extreme 
hydro-meteorological events is but a small - if high profile - subset of the extensive and 
heterogeneous contribution these groups make to the nation’s care-work.  As Yasmin 
Gunaratnam reminds us:  
 
It is more than likely that whenever we have been in need of care, or will require it in 
the future, it will be provided in some part by migrant and minoritized workers. 
These caregivers deliver our children, tend to our parents and grandparents, cook our 
food, clean our hospitals and bear witness to our naked emotional distress’ (2013: 14) 
 
Taking cues from feminist ethics of care and phenomenologies of embodied inter-relating, care 
can be seen as a kind of give-and-take between bodies, or what Roslyn Diprose (2002) refers to 
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as ‘inter-corporeality’.  There is something at once remarkable and very ordinary about caring 
practices – in the sense that these very exchanges between bodies function as deep and pervasive  
‘load-bearing structures of society’ (Vaughan, 2002: 98).  As Diprose would have it, the ‘giving’ of 
inter-corporeality is where agency and practice is born.  But by the same logic, she insists, it is 
also the premier site of forgetting and under-recognition:  the differentiated valuation of the 
giving and caring capacities of some bodies over those other bodies being the very foundation of 
social injustice (2002: 69, 9).  Or as Genevieve Vaughan puts it, such inter-corporeal gifts ‘travel 
upward in hierarchies, bearing with them the implication of value and power of those above over 
those below’ (2002: 111). 
 
In this regard, as Gunaratnam and fellow theorists of care have noted, the presence in the UK 
and other Northern nations of a great many care-workers – the majority of whom have come at 
some point from lower income economies - reflects complex global conditions in which wealth 
and opportunity are deeply stratified and ‘bodily vulnerability is unevenly fabricated, distributed 
and defended against’ (Gunaratnam, 2013: 14).  It speaks of a world in which mobilisations of 
care most often go against this gradient of vulnerability: flowing from zones of relative want to 
sites of comparative comfort and sufficiency.  In critical social and spatial analysis, the concept of 
‘global care chains’ has been developed as a way of understanding these uneven relations of care.  
Global care chains, as defined by Arlie Hochschild, refer to ‘a series of personal links between 
people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring’ (2000: 131) – in ways that 
draw attention to the gendered and often racialised creation and distribution of value in the 
trans-local provision of caring work (see also Yeates, 2004; Raghuram, 2012).  Such an 
understanding of the structuring of care relations in the contemporary world, we will be arguing, 
has much to offer when it comes to evaluating emerging policy directives around climate 
displacement – and for grappling with the broader question of climate justice.  
 
Like climate science itself, global policy-making finds it difficult to descend from high levels of 
abstraction and generalization to the grainy particularity and embodied experience of daily life 
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(see Jasanoff, 2011). In this paper, we make an effort to move back and forth between more 
macro scales of political discourse and the more micro-level, everyday kinetics of climate stress, 
displacement and attempts to stay put. Our argument hinges on the idea that responding to 
climate change is as much about offering care - and providing support to existing and emerging 
care relations – as it is about the provision of ‘technical’ or ‘economic’ assistance. As is also the 
case with more conventionally ‘practical’ responses to changing climate, the epicentre of these 
relations of care is deep within the most exposed and vulnerable communities. Care, we insist, 
takes shape through inherited and evolving practices at grassroots level, in both exceptional and 
everyday contexts (and in an ‘everyday’ that is becoming increasingly ‘extreme’).  
 
The immediate concern motivating this paper is that strategically important developments in 
policy with regard to climate-induced displacement look to have potentially adverse – indeed, 
counter-productive – consequences for the provision of care where it is most needed.   Reviewing the 
climate change and migration policy landscape, we identify a recent shift from an ‘alarmist’ and 
environmental determinist framing to a more flexible approach that views climate migration as a 
potentially positive adaptation to changing conditions.  However, what look to be more 
hospitable and caring policies, we suggest, actually embody sorting mechanisms that will exclude 
many of the most vulnerable. We then turn to accounts of ‘ground level’ responses to both 
chronic and rapid onset climate events – with examples that include flooding in Jakarta, Dhaka 
and Mumbai and super typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines - in order to offer a sense of how 
caring practices actually emerge under conditions of environmental stress. Bringing the 
arguments of these two sections together, with attention to the unequal gendering of care, we 
propose that climate migration policy is becoming disturbingly complicit with trends in the global 
economy of care-work that effectively syphon the most ‘able’ carers away from where they are 
most needed to places where need may be least urgent. In this light, we suggest, there is an urgent need 
to bring together the critical analysis of global climate displacement with critical studies of global care chains.  
 
Along the way, we ask questions about the very nature of caring practices. If caring relations 
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might be seen as emerging out of a kind of embodied attentiveness to the appeal of others who 
are exposed or laid low (Dikeç, et al, 2009), so too do effective caring practices require structure 
and organization.  With this in mind, we conclude with some considerations of what climate 
policies might look like that seek that to support care-giving where it is most needed – while also 
reflecting on some of the inherent tensions between the ‘spontaneous’ offering of care and the 
need for institutional or infrastructural support.   
 
 
Protecting Climate Refugees or Mobilizing the Labour Force?  
Among the decisions taken at the Climate Summit held in Paris in December 2015 was the 
establishment of a task force in order to ‘develop recommendations for integrated approaches to 
avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change’ 
(UNFCCC, 2015). This was the apex of a long story, with climate-induced displacement and 
migration featuring in successive reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 1992, 2007, 2014) and entering the agendas of a number of major players in climate 
politics and governance (e.g. Council of the European Union, 2008; Greenpeace, 2008; Stern, 
2007). A wealth of studies has offered insights and detailed accounts of the rise of environmental 
and climate migration in international policy arenas and the emergence of a series of competing 
discourses (Hall, 2016; Ransan-Cooper, Farbotko, McNamara, Thornton, & Chevalier, 2015).  
 
Early engagements tended towards alarmist predictions of catastrophe-driven mass migration, 
triggering proposals to ‘secure’ potential host nations against anticipated influxes of so-called 
‘climate refugees’ (e.g. Myers, 1993, 2005; Reuveny, 2007). Basically, the idea was that the impacts 
of climate change, above a threshold, would make vulnerable areas uninhabitable – thereby 
effecting mass displacement. This in turn built on a mechanistic and mono-causal model of 
migration – that for a long time had the effect of alienating migration scholars from debates on 
the climate-mobility linkages. While largely discredited in academic circles (Black, 2001; Castles, 
2002; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Oels, 2010), framing in terms of mass displacement, climate 
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refugees and security has been very prominent in advocacy (Christian Aid, 2007; Environmental 
Justice Foundation, 2009) and in policy arenas (Council of the European Union, 2008; Stern, 
2007), and still features in media headlines1. Notwithstanding its flaws, the figure of the climate 
refugee has an undeniable evocative power and provides a ‘human face’ to climate change, and it 
resonates with the lexicons, concerns and agendas of environmental and humanitarian 
organizations (Bettini, 2013).  
 
In the last few years, and in particular since the publication of a very influential report from the 
UK Foresight Office (Foresight, 2011), a more nuanced and measured register has gained ground 
in policy and academic circles. The multi-causal understanding of migration prevalent in 
contemporary scholarship has become widely accepted, as has the idea that - given the tangle of 
factors playing out in migration processes - it is almost impossible to point to individuals or 
populations whose mobility is determined solely by environmental change (Carr, 2005; Massey, 
Axinn, & Ghimire, 2010). The nexus climate-migration is increasingly understood as a matrix of 
mobility responses characterised by different combinations of voluntariness, aims, geographical 
scope and duration (Adger et al., 2015; Foresight, 2011; IPCC, 2014; Warner et al., 2013). While 
concern over permanent cross-border climate-induced displacement has not waned (see for 
instance the Nansen Initiative and the recently launched Disaster Displacement Platform), 
contemporary policy debates also discuss the idea of planned relocation (de Sherbinin et al., 
2011). There are increasing concerns also about so-called ‘trapped populations’ ( Black et al, , 
2013). Indeed, in a world in which climate change is accelerating, particularly one in which 
‘dangerous levels’ are reached, mobility could be disrupted rather than enhanced.  Labelling 
populations as ‘trapped’ is analytically difficult and requires caution – as it risks legitimizing top-
down relocation plans (Adams, 2016).  However, under conditions in which ecological 
vulnerability and socio-economic marginalization are escalating, it seems likely that the number 
                                                          
1
 See for instance articles in The Independent (Bawden, 2014), The Guardian (2015), The National Observer (Dinshaw, 
2015), Time (Baker, 2015). 
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of people lacking the means to move would also rise. An increasing number of people might thus 
find themselves ‘forced’ to stay put. 
 
At face value, some of the emerging narratives appear to acknowledge the grassroots or 
vernacular coping and adaptation strategies deployed by many vulnerable communities.  In 
particular, the idea that (governed) migration can be a successful adaptation strategy has recently 
gained popularity (e.g. Black et al, 2011; Tacoli, 2009; UNFCCC, 2010). As influential an actor as 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been among the non-academic supporters of this idea, 
stating that ‘properly managed and supported, migration … can often improve livelihoods, 
reduce poverty, meet labor force needs, bolster economies, and strengthen links between 
communities and countries’ (ADB, 2012).  In this way, the vulnerable themselves are represented 
as agents of adaptation and resilience. 
 
When compared to the scaremongering and the pathologization of migration inflecting much of 
the debate on ‘climate refugees’, these recent narratives have an appealingly humanistic façade – 
especially when the tides of fear surrounding migration are high, as at the moment of writing. At 
a closer look, however, the idea of ‘migration as adaptation’ is less reassuring.  In fact, what it 
praises are not autonomous practices of mutual care, solidarity and support  – such as those in 
Jakarta, Dhaka and Mumbai that we will shortly address. In the discourse on migration as 
adaptation the ‘vulnerable’ are expected to take their destiny into their own hands – quite literally, 
as it is through the mobilization of their labour force that they are expected to become resilient.  
 
This focus on labour migration as adaptation mechanism signals a developmentalization of 
climate discourse. But this is not in the sense of viewing vulnerability and displacement as a result 
of international economic gradients and inequalities – as was the motivation for the intervention 
of Atiq Rahman with which we opened the paper.  Rather, in the discourses in question, being 
‘adaptable’ is equated with being ‘able to respond tactically to anthropogenic alterations of the 
biophysical world while becoming ever more the subjects of capitalist market relations’ (Felli & 
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Castree, 2012: 1). And this vision of adaptation is largely  ‘consistent with the neoliberal practice 
of constituting a new global reserve army of labour’ (Felli & Castree, 2012: 3). Labour markets 
and economic exchanges become the main vehicles for adaptation – and for climate policy more 
broadly. This emphasis on the ‘agency’ of the vulnerable, to be exercised by mobilizing their 
labour and producing remittances that will finance self-adaptation, echoes the agendas of 
mainstream international players concerned with the so-called development-migration nexus, 
which have indeed become key actors in climate change policy (for a critical discussion of this 
point, see Bettini & Gioli, 2016). What is heralded is an economized logic in which South-South 
circular and temporary migration function as decentralized mechanisms of risk management and 
sources of funding for adaptation and development.  
 
If the most ‘adaptable’ individuals from climate-impacted zones are being offered the 
‘opportunity’ of incorporation in global labour markets, it must be asked, what happens to those 
left behind to face worsening environmental hardship?  What will be the fate of those who do 
not have the capital (financial, social, human) to ‘rise to the occasion’ and become mobile, 
adaptable and resilient? Here we see signs of the ‘global triage’ of the fit from the unfit identified 
by Dillon and Reid (2009) as key ingredient of developmental interventions. In the climate 
migration case, this means the separation of the adapted from the maladapted, of those able to 
render their mobility into a fruitful investment from those fleeing because of desperation or 
stuck because of deprivation.  In other words, the idea of migration as adaptation appears as a 
mechanism fostering ‘good circulation’, but one that also further marginalizes the sources of ‘bad 
circulation’. From this angle, climate refugees and climate migrants appear as two sides of the 
same coin.  On the side of ‘bad circulation’ are all those who are undeveloped, non-resilient, 
maladapted and pathologically unfit, and on the ‘good circulation’ side those who are adaptable 
to climate change and fit for neoliberal rule.  
 
There is a ruthlessness in this mechanism, with those (at risk of being) displaced by a synergy of 
climatic and extra-climatic destabilization finding themselves ‘free’ to provide the low-wage work 
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in wealthier cities, regions, or nations – with the added irony that this often involves care work. 
This directly links precariousness in relation to changing ecological and geoclimatic conditions to 
precarious employment. While abandoning the majority who lack resources, it translates mobility 
into the capacity to take one’s labour power elsewhere.  In this context, we ask, if the most ‘able’ 
people from vulnerable regions are to end up - among other things - providing care for the 
wealthier populations of less vulnerable regions, who is expected to look after those suffering at 
the sharp end of climate change?  From the more rarefied domain of international policy 
discourse, we turn now to the lived experience of those people most exposed to climatic 
variability and extremity – to the mundane reality of living with storm surges, overflowing drains 
and rivers, collapsing infrastructure.  
 
 
Practicing Care under Conditions of Climate Stress  
In this section, we look to the ground-level ‘advent’ of care in the face of climatic exposure - 
both for the lessons it might offer in a world of accelerating climate change and for what it 
means right now for those caught in the path of deteriorating conditions - many of whom have 
already migrated out of climate-impacted rural areas only find themselves vulnerable in a new and 
different ways in their adopted urban environments.  
 
Climate science currently lacks – and may never attain - the granularity that would permit us to 
isolate the proportion of any weather event directly attributable to human influence. Even so, 
there is scientific consensus that anthropogenic climate change is already adding a significant 
surcharge to many hydro-meteorological rhythms and events.  There is now a considerable body 
of research concerned with the ways in which rural people are attempting to deal with 
environmental stresses to which these climatic transitions contribute (Adger, 2003; Agrawal and 
Perrin, 2009).  Only recently have similar questions been seriously asked of urban populations, 
especially those in cities where infrastructure cannot be relied upon to cope with excessive – or 
even ordinary – demands. As Jabeen et al observe:  
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significant lessons can be drawn from examining how the urban poor are already coping 
with conditions of increased vulnerability induced by changing climate as well as 
extreme weather events such as floods, heavy rains, landslides, heat and drought, and 
understanding how they respond to hazards caused by them  (2010: 415) 
 
Many of the world’s most populous and fast growing urban agglomerations are coastal or located 
on river watersheds and subject to the variability of monsoon systems or the El Nino Southern 
Oscillation - both of which, climatologists have suggested, show variations linked with global 
warming (Kumar, 2013; Satterthwaite et al, 2007: 24).   In Mumbai, monsoonal flooding is now 
considered ‘normal’, while parts of Jakarta were inundated five times in 2015 (Macfarlane, 2012: 
100; Holderness and Turpin, 2016). So accustomed are many Jakartans to the resurgence of 
polluted, foul-smelling floodwaters, disaster response teams recount, that they are reluctant to 
leave their homes until water levels reach two or more metres - at which point urgent evacuation 
is called for (Maclean, 2014).  It is these routine struggles, we would suggest, more so than either 
spectres of mass migration or strategies of entrepreneurial trans-nationalism that characterises 
the mundane reality of climate displacement and attempts to stay put. 
 
The everyday life of most cities of the South, it has been observed, demands constant work of 
adjustment, of making connections and new articulations.  In the words of AbdouMaliq Simone:  
‘the urban fabric is always changing, driven by the relative lack of “cemented” trajectories and 
networks of relations among materials, people, events, and space (2011: 361-2). Layered into 
these ordinary theatres of improvisation are emergent responses to climatic variability:  dwellings 
with new forms of ‘green’ shading to reduce heat stress, storing crucial, household goods on 
shelves or high ground, elevated door entries and sandbagging, raised furniture and houses on 
stilts (Maclean, 2014; Banks et al 2011, Braun and Aßheuer, 2011).  In Jakarta, already a centre of 
dense social media usage, a new online platform allows urban residents in their hundreds of 
thousands to contribute to a real-time flood mapping application that both assists emergency 
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management and helps citizens negotiate flooded cityscapes (Holderness and Turpin, 2016; 
Padawangi et al, 2016).  
 
When it comes to weathering extreme events, even more important than sociotechnical and 
material practices, most researchers attest, is the role of social networks and solidarities.  It is 
associations of neighbours, relatives and friends – usually referred to as ‘informal’, however 
organized they might be – that most often provide emergency shelter, provisioning, information 
and emotional support, and frequently financial assistance, in times of hardship (Roy and Hulme 
2013; Jabeen et al, 2010).  As Braun and Aßheuer observe of hydrological extreme events in 
Dhaka: ‘Given that neighbors and relatives have, in most cases, also been affected by the flood, 
the significance of these personal networks for mutual help is surprising. People help each other 
regardless of how much they are affected themselves’ (2011: 782).  
 
Much of this assistance has a distinctly demotic and non-hierarchical tenor. Indeed, it has been 
noted that the very design of many low-income settlements – with shared courtyards and other 
collective spaces – serves to encourage inter-household networking and collaboration (Jabeen et 
al, 2010: 429).  But other aspects of social support during and after extreme events follow well-
entrenched social hierarchies. Western observers might be surprised to hear from researchers in 
Dhaka that ‘slum’ landlords often seem to take their responsibilities seriously in times of crisis, to 
the extent of providing food, clothing and other provisions to tenants and allowing displaced 
friends or relatives of existing tenants to stay free of charge  (Roy, Hulme and Jahan, 2013: 168; 
Braun and Aßheuer, 2011; 780).  Most researchers stress the importance of mutuality in support 
networks in the cities of the South, often using the term ‘social capital’ to refer to a gradual 
accruing of trust, shared values and reciprocity over time (Adger, 2003; Braun and Aßheuer, 
2011.    
 
Other observers have drawn attention to overtures that break out of this imagined circuit of 
exchange, pointing to openings to others that are in advance or in excess of any foreseeable 
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reciprocation: outpourings of care and assistance that often come from those we might imagine 
to have least resources to spare. Flows of care do not (always) mirror gradients of affluence or 
power. In the context of Hurricane Katrina (2005), John Protevi tells of the many thousands of 
New Orleanians who did not abandon the elderly, the incapacitated and the most vulnerable, but 
stayed on to help, in acts of ‘heroic solidarity, (that) what we should not be afraid to call “love”’ 
(2006: 377; see also Clark, 2011: 146-159).   Likewise, Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria’s account of 
grassroots responses to Mumbai’s extreme flooding of 2005 which spotlights an effusive and 
generous street level self-organization:   
 
people came out of their homes to hand out biscuits, bananas, bottled water, and 
cooked rice and lentils to those stranded in buses….Who were these young men 
who jumped into the water to save stranded bus passengers? .... These men 
constitute the city’s vast population of unemployed or, more commonly, 
underemployed …. In sum, they constitute the notorious crowd and chaos of 
the Indian city’s streets, for long the nightmare of modernist city planners (2006: 
81). 
 
While Anjaria offers a heart-warming and provocative rereading of a maligned sector of the 
Mumbai populace, we might also ask who cooked the food that these young men were 
distributing, and what else might have been going on away from the visibility of the street.  
As in so many other contexts, much of the responsibility for providing care in situations of 
environmental deterioration and extremity is taken upon by women - or falls upon them.   
 
Accounts of super typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) that struck the Philippines in 2013 foreground 
women’s caring and compassionate roles, and in may cases, their enhanced post-Haiyan 
community leadership and income-generating roles.  Though researchers are quick to add that ‘in 
many instances these new responsibilities have not led to the rethinking of traditional gender 
roles, but have simply translated into increased burdens for displaced women and their families’ 
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(Sherwood et al 2015: 4). As in many disaster contexts, over the course of typhoon Haiyan 
women and girls not only faced exacerbated health and hygiene challenges, but also suffered 
increased sexual violence and abuse (Valerio, 2014; Sherwood et al, 2015: 58-9).  There were also 
reports that human traffickers were able to capitalize on conditions of relaxed border controls, 
displacement and loss of livelihood to intensify existing practices recruitment into forced labour 
– including sex work (Tesfay, 2015). 
 
However, there are other, potentially more positive ways in which trans-border mobilizations 
played a significant role in the vernacular response to the Haiyan crisis. Ranked in the top ten of 
nations for climate change vulnerability and second in terms of natural disaster risk  (Tesfay, 
2015: 11), the Philippines are also at the forefront of exporting ‘surplus labour’ to higher income 
nations, with some 10 million people - approximately 25 percent of the labour force – currently 
working overseas, positioning the country as the world’s the third largest recipient of migrants’ 
remittances (Mosuela and Matias, 2014: 5-8). Cleovi Mosuela and Denise Matias (2014) draw our 
attention to the importance not only of ongoing remittances by Filipina/Filipino trans-national 
workers during the post-Haiyan recovery process, humanitarian assistance, but also of dedicated 
fund-raising and other long-distance humanitarian efforts. As they put it: ‘cross-border migrants 
… constitute an international network of Filipinos who are instrumental not only in keeping the 
Philippine economy afloat but also in constituting a network that may serve as a response to 
major environmental disasters in the Philippines’ (2014: 8).   
 
In this section we have been observing the improvisational hustle – at work in Mumbai, Dhaka, 
New Orleans, Jakarta, or the Philippines’ Tacloban City - through which resourceful but under-
resourced people endure environmental hardship.  If Haiyan’s ground-level ‘stories of hope, 
courage, creativity, and empowerment’ are representative of the way the people in so many low-
income, under-resourced regions manage to endure catastrophe (Valerio, 2014: 156; see also 
Sherwood et al 2015: 46), so too is it vital to recognize that ‘grass-roots’ does not simply imply 
local: the Philippines case being a reminder that capacities for care now flow and circulate as 
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globally as the components of climate itself. 
 
We have no hesitation in following Mosuela and Matias in affirming the ethical and practical 
import of mobilizations by transnational migrants in response to the devastation wrought by 
Haiyan. However, we want to step back at this point and consider what else might be at stake in 
situations in which migrant workers find themselves drawn to respond to extreme or chronic 
environmental conditions from a distance. In the light of our earlier discussion of recent policy 
shifts regarding climate displacement, we ask what it might mean to reconfigure migration as a 
positive, flexible, and economically-rational response to intensifying climatic stress – in a world in 
which increasingly numbers of people are implicated in the stretched out and uneven relations 
that characterise global care chains.  Or to put it another way, in times of ‘dangerous’ or 
‘extremely dangerous’ climate change, how is heightened participation in an economized logic of 
transnational care-work likely to impact on existing grassroots adaptive and caring practices – in 
the most vulnerable places?  
 
 
When Climate Change meets Global Care Chains 
The Philippine government, through the outward-looking orientation of the Department of 
Labor and Employment, has itself come to recognize the contribution of overseas workers to 
disaster relief – in keeping with its active promotion of the ‘heroic’ work ethic, discipline, and 
flexibility of its migrant workforce. In a nuanced account of Filipinas working abroad, Gibson, 
Law and McKay (2001) encourage us to view these women – many of whom domestic labourers 
or care-workers – neither as heroes of national development nor as passive victims of the 
demands of global capitalist labour markets, but as active – if constrained – agents with scope for 
negotiating their working conditions and advancing their own economic aspirations (see also 
Yeoh et al, 2005).  This resonates with Mosuela and Matias’s assessment of the self-
organizational capacities and adaptability of post-Haiyan trans-border mobilizations 
‘(T)ransnational activists’, they observe, ‘gain new attitudes, try out new forms of action in 
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response to feelings of empathy and emerge with new identities as empowered individuals 
through their contacts within and across borders’ (2014: 20).  
 
While the Philippines ‘has earned international recognition as a global model country for labour-
exporting countries’ (Mosuela and Matias, 2014: 7), other climate-change vulnerable nations or 
regions – such as Indonesia and Bangladesh - are also major sources of labour migration. Much 
of this work is in the caring and domestic sectors.  Analyses of transnational political economies 
of care suggest that demand for the care-giving capacities of women from low income regions 
arises in large part because current market (under)valuation of their labour ensures that their 
care-work generates a certain surplus of value.  As Parvati Raghuram explains sums the workings 
and of these global care chains - and their implications: ‘(in) the global redistribution of care 
resulting from female migration – migrant women from the global South care for families in 
distant countries of destination, typically in the North, while leaving behind a care deficit in the 
source countries’  (2012: 158). Similar logics are at work, we would add, in the accelerating 
circulation of domestic labourers or care-workers between relatively poorer and wealthier zones 
within the global South 
 
This is no small business, not simply a supplement to the ‘real deal’ of global circulation of 
commodities or of so-called ‘productive’ labour.  Addressing not only migrants who provide 
some kind of domestic labour and the household relation they enter into, but also the multiple 
ways that ‘care deficits’ are filled in countries of origin, Maliha Safri and Julie Graham (2010) 
propose that the unit of the household ought to be viewed as a significant transnational 
economic actor. Indeed, when they tote up all those incorporated in some way in domestic 
relations with some form of economic value that stretch across national borders Safri and 
Graham estimate that at least 800 million people – 12 percent of the world’s population – may 
now be living in what they refer to as ‘global households’ (2010: 108-9). 
 
While these mostly female workers look after the young, the elderly the infirm of wealthier 
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regions, researchers have shown, they simultaneously construct complex topologies of care-at-
distance as they seek to sustain intimate relations with their own loved ones at home (Parreñas, 
2005; Yeoh et al 2005). If maintaining caring relationships at either end of the ‘global care chain’ 
can be profoundly stressful and demanding at the best of times (see van der Ham et al, 2015), it 
is difficult to imagine the fear, uncertainty and raw physical disconnection experienced when an 
event as catastrophic as Haiyan is witnessed from across an unbridgeable distance (see O’Brien, 
2013).   
 
We need to keep in mind that alongside the physical suffering and loss of homes and livelihoods 
resulting from the super typhoon, there was widespread grief, depression and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Sherwood et al, 2105: 57). So too should we recall that climate change, in ways 
that escape precise metrics, is nudging extreme events from the exceptional to the normal.  
Whether it is Jakarta’s five episodes of flooding in 2015, the six other major hurricanes that 
accompanied Katrina in the North Atlantic Hurricane season of 2005, or the average of twenty 
four other typhoons that struck the Philippines in the year of Haiyan (Mosuela and Matias, 2104: 
9), life in many parts of the world is increasingly a matter of living with extremity.   
 
 
If the global household, as Safri and Graham (2010: 118) suggest, is now a ‘cornerstone’ of the 
international economy, what happens, what might yet happen, we are asking, when the pillars of 
these economic and emotional load-bearing structures are submerged, storm-damaged, 
dehydrated?  If the supply chains of care-work and related forms of insecure, low income labour 
provide the likely channels for the ‘good circulation’ of climate migrants, so too will deteriorating 
climatic conditions – particularly at sites of origin – increasingly shape the contours of care 
deficits and the practices that respond to these shortfalls.  And if, as Raghuram points out, there 
are already extensive ‘care deficits’ in the source countries of domestic labour migration, what 
kind of shortfalls should we expect in a world experiencing ‘dangerous’ to ‘extremely dangerous’ 
climate change? 
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But just as Safri and Graham contend that the very significance of the global household in the 
contemporary transnational economy – with all its hidden, undervalued, but none-the-less pivotal 
activities – has an immense transformative potential, so too are we proposing that existing 
ground-level capacities for care and mutual support are the cornerstone of collective responses to 
changing climate.  ‘(S)mall, dispersed, unorganized, and relatively invisible’ household actors, 
Safri and Graham insist ‘… are not aspects of a futuristic dream but existing formations that are 
actively transforming economic landscapes’ (2010: 121,113). By the same token, we are arguing, a 
vast host of under-resourced, under-recognised, unorganized or semi-organised actors are already 
providing the vital sub-structure of care in the time of climate crisis – and in this regard deserve 
to be considered a key to future climate policy. 
 
 
Towards Care-ful Climate Policy  
Earlier in the paper we recounted how critical commentators have grown anxious over emerging 
complicity between more alarmist approaches to the ‘climate refugee’ issue and concerns with 
territorial securitization. But we have also shown how a set of discursive and practical responses 
that initially seemed more ‘balanced’ in their reframing of migration as an adaptive response to 
climatic deterioration turn out to have complicities of their own.  Although it is often extreme 
events that make suffering - and the responses it attracts - most visible, our intention has been to 
work towards the increasingly mundane presence of intensifying climate change.  We have seen 
how crisis situations, with their upending of everyday social relations, can help foreground the 
caring capacities of those whose ethical-practical potentialities are often marginalized or 
overlooked, especially in the urban context.  So too have we cautioned that the drama and 
heroism of the catastrophe can itself privilege the acts of some over others – in particular by 
obscuring the more quotidian, ‘load-bearing’ care-work of women. But this gendering of care and 
its unequal recognition, we have been arguing, is also reproduced at larger scales.  
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As we noted above, this is a formative moment in the assembling of policy platforms that are 
promoting care in the context of climate change to ‘travel upward in hierarchies’ from the places 
where deficit is most keenly, painfully felt  - towards relatively secure regions endowed with 
disproportionate care-purchasing power.  We would stress that such turns in policy priority 
contravene the principle of wealthier nations subsidizing poorer nations in their development of 
adaptive capacities to respond to climate change that was enshrined twenty five years ago in 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, just as they undermine the 
commitment to ‘integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to 
the adverse impacts of climate change’ that the majority of the world’s nation states signed up to 
at COP 21 in 2015.   
 
To lever climate policy in the direction of supporting grassroots, community and household 
efforts at the sharp end of climate vulnerability is partly a matter of foregrounding the existing 
adaptive capacities of the under-resourced and the marginalized. As Banks, Roy and Hulme 
insist, the urban poor must be ‘equipped with an institutional framework that supports their 
efforts to increase resilience…’ (2011: 500).  But alongside this, it requires the full 
acknowledgement that the embodied, affective and practical capacities of care itself are basal 
components of the ‘resilience’ and ‘adaptation’ that enable everyday life to go on in much of the 
world.   If climate policy is to be care-ful, if it is to enhance the care of those impacted by chronic 
or extreme conditions, we are arguing, it must take its bearings from immensity of ‘worldly’ 
gestures and practices through which bodies shape and sustain each other - not least during those 
times or in those places in which more formalised supporting structures fall short.  
 
So too do we need to be mindful that the very idea of organizing care – in the context of climate 
change or in any situation – is always going to be a complex and paradoxical proposition. For if, 
as we have been suggesting, the very event of caring depends on a susceptibility and openness to 
the perceived need of others – then there is always a vital aspect of care that precedes or exceeds 
whatever formal provisions are put in place to facilitate caring relations. The question then arises 
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– or rather, is always already present – as to how to make the move from the ‘spontaneity’ of 
receptivity to the decisive, intentional and organized actions that make for an effective response.  
Indeed, how to keep these moments ceaselessly and productively open to one other is a tension 
or demand that animates the most searching ethico-political inquiry.  As Noxolo, Raghuram and 
Madge insist, without ‘a set of practices – there is no “responsibility work”– and therefore, there 
are no institutional parameters for assessing responsible action’ (2012: 420).  But as Gunaratnam 
adds, care-giving organizations and professional cultures find themselves constantly interrogated, 
interrupted, or provoked by the singularity and specific needs of those to whom they attend 
(2013: 47-50).   
 
Competent care, in this regard, requires at once the granularity of attention to lived, embodied 
experience and a clear eye to the conditions that both frame the caring relation and structure the 
very need for care. As Jacques Derrida asserts, in a more general sense,   ‘one can't make a 
responsible decision without science or conscience, without knowing what one is doing, for what 
reasons, in view of what and under what conditions' (1995: 24).  But this only serves to 
underscore the immensity of the challenge that faces ‘caring’ climate policy – with its yawning 
spatio-temporal disjuncture between, on the one hand, the global scale of climate science and 
climate negotiation, and on the other, singular human bodies struggling to cope with deluge, heat, 
dirt, hunger and exhaustion. 
 
While there is a growing body of critical work on politics and policy around climate displacement 
and a burgeoning genre on the lived experience of changing climate, there is still much to done 
to connect up these registers – in both thought and practice.  In this paper, we have been 
suggesting that a pivotal – if perplexing – issue is how to articulate between ‘ground level’ 
improvisation and  ‘higher level’ policy-making – whether at city, state or inter-state scales.  More 
pointedly, we have drawn attention to articulations between grassroots or communal care are 
already taking shape in international climate migration policy initiatives – in ways that we find 
deeply disturbing.  The challenge, we would suggest, is how to arrest and reverse the move to 
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entice care-giving capabilities to travel against the gradient of greatest need while at the same 
time discouraging modes of critique that position the climatically vulnerable simply as victims – 
and in this way efface both their compassion and their practical capacities.    
 
Without wishing to absolve wealthier nations from their responsibility to lower income and 
climate vulnerable regions, there are good reasons to the question prevailing assumptions about 
the directionality of care and support at the global scale. One of the motivations of Anjaria’s 
counter-posing of Mumbai and New Orleans was ‘to understand the Third World city as offering 
some of the solutions for the world’s cities (2006: 82):  an aspiration in keeping with a more 
general tendency in post-colonial thought to conceive of multi-lateral circuits of knowledge and 
practice that unsettle received familiar North-to-South hierarchies (Noxolo et al, 2012; Jazeel and 
McFarlane 2007, Murphy 2015).  In this regard, we would do well to recall Cuba’s (declined) 
offer of emergency assistance to US Gulf States hit by Katrina – a potentially effective 
intervention given Cuba’s own first-rate domestic record in hurricane protection and relief 
(Martin 2005), and Bangladesh’s exemplary achievement in reducing the death toll from super 
cyclones by some 99% in less than four decades (Roy, Hanlon and Hume, 2016: 2, 63).   
 
Similar capacities that work against assumed aid-beneficiary gradients may also be embodied by 
migrants themselves.  As Raghuram observes: ‘Migrants bring … different understandings of 
care – how to care, towards what purpose, who should be cared for, how care should be shared 
or paid for – when they move’ (2012: 160).  They may also, as in the case of the Al-Imdaad 
Foundation - the north England Islamic civil society organisation that mobilized so effectively 
during Storm Desmond – bring with them a certain breadth of climatic experience.  
 
By way of conclusion we would make a strong case for critically analysing climate migration 
policy and practice in close collaboration with the study of global care chains. And although we 
are realistic about the powerful counter-forces in play, we offer four key policy 
recommendations: 
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 Addressing climate change must be understood to be as much about supporting and 
facilitating care relations as about seeking technical solutions.  
 
 As is the case with more ‘practical’ responses to environmental stress and change, the 
most crucial site of caring practices is the everyday world of affective and inter-corporeal 
relations.  
 
 There is an urgent need to review current policy priorities that encourage the movement 
of the most able caregivers from sites or regions where they are likely to be most in 
demand to places where there is a relative abundance of care.  
 
 Learning to care and to support caring practices more effectively is a process that ought 
to be broadly searching, ceaselessly experimental and multi-directional, at very least 
moving backwards and forth across global divides of economic privilege.  
 
Finally, we need to recall that there would be no global economy of care without the inclination 
of embodied actors to open themselves to the needs of others, no opportunity to convert 
climate-stressed bodies into mobile, profitable labour if those exposed to climate change were 
not already supporting each other through demanding and debilitating circumstances. Caring 
relations, we have been suggesting, are constantly shifting, evolving, recreating themselves. Care 
in the time of chronic and catastrophic climatic change can emerge both in the most mundane 
and the most extraordinary situations.  Either way it can do with all the support it can possibility 
get.  There is an urgent need, we have been arguing, for developing policy responses that will 
nourish and sustain dis-positions towards care in the places where it is most needed.  But care is 
always fraught with tension, cut with impurities, fated to fall short or go awry. And this is why its 
organization or institutionalization is as risky as it is necessary, a process – at its best – of 
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